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1. The Political Im portance of Nuclear 
Power
Modern capitalism has turned increasingly 
towards technological ‘advances’ that are 
suspect in the extreme. They are marked by 
their dubious or plainly negative contribution 
to human welfare, and by their destructive 
effects on the environment. There are some 
whose harmfulness is now widely recognised - 
as, for example, the replacement of efficient 
mass transit by a commitment to the private 
automobile, the switch to detergents, the 
massive use of pesticides, the waste of energy 
in packaging (particularly the non-returnable 
bottle and the aluminium can), ( i)
It is now clear, however, that one particular 
development - the nuclear power industry - 
looms above all others, in its ominous 
implications for the future of humanity, and in 
its significance as an issue on which mass 
action against the system’s irrationality is 
likely.
Its predominance derives, firstly, from the 
sh e e r m a g n itu d e  o f th e  e c o n o m ic  
commitment involved. The leading capitalist 
countries intend to generate most of their 
electrical power by nuclear means before the 
tu rn  of the cen tu ry , necess ita ting  an 
unprecedented speed of construction. Over 
the next decade alone, the US government 
hopes to see nuclear capacity increased 
eightfold; France and Japan aim at roughly 
fifteen-fold growth. These programs imply 
that the USA fo r instance, is to spend well over 
a trillion dollars (that is a million m illion) on the 
nuclear industry in the next two and a half 
decades. (2) It has been estimated that, if the 
1985 target is achieved, the nuclear power 
industry w ill absorb over fifty per cent of gross 
US capital formation over the next decade.
Next in importance is the transparency of 
the irrationality involved. It is not a matter of 
waiting till consequences d ifficu lt to foresee 
have come to pass - as, for example, it was 
necessary for the polluting effect of detergents 
actually to show themselves, or for the cities to
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become congested, polluted and deformed by 
the automobile. The damage inherent in the 
nuclear development can be clearly foreseen 
at this very moment.
The th ird  feature  is one of specia l 
significance for social change: it concerns the 
response of the populations in the advanced 
capitalist countries when they are reached by 
th e  a rg u m e n ts  o ve r n u c le a r  p o w e r. 
Outstanding here is the example of Sweden, 
the only country where the issue has been 
made the subject of more or less formal 
nation-wide discussion. These discussions, 
carried on in the course of the year 1974, saw 
the population swing from approval of the 
nuclear program to better than two-to-one 
opposition. As a result, the government cut its 
ten-year nuclear target to one-seventh 
of its former size (from fourteen reactors to 
two). (3)
Similar responses on a more local scale have 
been evident in the USA where the nuclear 
industry openly expresses its fear that nuclear 
moratoria (federal or state) w ill be imposed as 
a result of public opposition. (4)
Thus it is not simply a question of a valid 
issue, implying a struggle for all concerned 
with humanity's future. The campaign against 
the nuc lea r com m itm ent a lso has the 
character of a transitional demand, striking at 
the very assumptions of consumerist society, 
and yet understandable to and acceptable by 
the people affected.
In countries of the Third World, the political 
context of the nuclear issue is different but the 
validity of the struggle is no less clear. It is 
necessary to emphasise this point, particularly 
since the proponents of nuclear power often 
advance arguments allegedly based on the 
interests of a power-starved Third World. *
II. Why the Nuclear Programs are 
Unacceptable
The dangers associated with nuclear power 
have been adequately explained in a number 
of publications, and here we w ill simply refer 
the reader to them. (5) They fall under the 
following main headings:
1. Unscheduled discharges of radiation to 
the environment, in amounts exceeding 
the low levels prescribed in normal 
operation.
2. Catastrophic releases of fuel or waste 
materials, following on a ‘melt-down’ of 
the fuel after an accident.
3. Deliberate release, or the threat of it, of 
rad ioactive  m ateria ls , by crim ina l 
extortionists or the insane ("nuclear 
malevolence” ).
4. Environmental damage arising from 
nuclear wastes (whose disposal remains 
an unsolved problem).
5. Undesirable political and social measures 
adopted to cope with these hazards.
The possible magnitude of some of these 
dangers can be judged from the simple facts 
conce rn ing  the h ig h ly  to x ic  e lem ent 
plutonium. The maximum permissible annual 
intake of plutonium is at present one millionth 
of a gram, a quantity known to be capable of 
causing cancer (and considered too high a risk 
by many authorities, including Britain's 
Medical Research Council. (6) But the most 
common type of nuclear reactor, in normal 
operation, over one year, produces about 200 
kilograms of plutonium.
Of course, stringent precautions are taken 
to ensure that this and other radioactive 
poisons are contained and never reach the 
atmosphere. But no system of containment 
can be perfect, nor verified with absolute 
accuracy. (Today, for example, the inventory 
of plutonium in a reactor cannot be checked to 
better than one per cent).
Suppose then that, by the end of the century, 
when upwards of 2,000 reactors are envisaged, 
a small fraction of the plutonium generated in 
a year ‘leaks’ to the atmosphere - whether by 
accident or malevolent design. If the leak is as 
small as one hundredth of one per cent of the 
total, this still constitutes a maximum 
permissible dose for every person in the world, 
ten times over.
The nuclear program thus embodies a 
proposal to organise power production 
around stocks of highly poisonous substances 
in quantities almost unimaginably vast in 
relation to their toxicity. To accept such a 
program, one would need to be supremely 
confident of the social system in which it is to 
be implemented - confident both of its ability 
to maintain unprecedentedly high standards 
of technical skill with absolutely infallible 
rigor, and of its political and social stability 
over many generations. The reader can be 
presumed to lack such confidence.
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Despite the quite extraordinary and often 
ingenious safety routines implemented by the 
nuclear technologists, whose efforts to 
achieve the im poss ib le  must com pel 
admiration, the safety of the US nuclear 
industry has already been the target of 
damaging criticisms. These concern the 
workings of about fifty  reactors in the w orld ’s 
most industrially advanced country; what can 
be expected when perhaps 2,000 reactors are 
operating in dozens of countries throughout 
the world?
Some indications of an aswer to this 
question was given by Jean-Claude Leny, 
managing director of Framatome, in March 
this year. It took the form of a broad hint to 
investors, that the profitability of nuclear 
power in France would not be allowed to suffer
- like the American industry’s - from an 
exaggerated concern for safety .... (7). As for 
the possibility of malevolent activity, the infant 
nuclear industry of the USA can already 
record, amongst other incidents, a threat to 
crash a highjacked plane into a reactor, a 
series of apparent sabotage attempts in a re­
processing plant, and the selection of nuclear 
plants for terrorist blackmail attacks by 
followers of Charles Manson. (8)
It should be remembered that the possible 
damage arising from nuclear catastrophes is 
not confined to the existing population in the 
country of occurrence. The very nature of the 
radioactive threat lends itself to dispersal in 
space over national and even continental 
boundaries, and to persistence in time so that 
generations remote from the present suffer 
illness and death (the genetic effects of 
radiation). The lesson from the USA in 
particular is that the industry’s safety 
standards will tend to be proportional to public 
concern over the issue; in this light, the 
struggle against nuclear power can be seen 
also as a simple struggle fo r human survival on 
the planet.
The disposal of waste materials from 
reactors - and of the worn-out reactors 
themselves - remains an unsolved problem. Its 
magnitude can be gauged from one figure 
alone: the annual wastes from an average 
reactor today con ta in  1,000 tim es the 
radioactivity of the Hiroshima bomb. While 
research proceeds on possible methods of 
permanent disposal, the industry contents 
itself with 'waste management’ - that is, 
retrievable and (it is hoped) secure methods of
storage. Here it should be noted that the cost 
of this ‘temporary’ storage (which is by no 
means at a satisfactory level of security) w ill 
rise in the next two and a half decades to some 
seven billion dollars in the United States alone. 
It is easy, then, to understand the fear 
expressed by US Environmental Protection 
Agency experts, of “ the possibility that an 
interim engineered storage system may 
become permanent solely due to economic 
costs” . (9)
To understand the ominous implications 
here, one should first note that the interim 
m ethods make the po isonous waste 
‘retrievable’ - or in other words, accessible. 
Thus they continually invite malevolently- 
inspired acquisition or atmospheric release. 
Also, the time scale of the ‘permanent’ storage 
required is not in dispute: the long-lasting 
com ponen t o f the wastes (p a rt ic u la r ly  
plutonium) must be kept rigorously clear of 
the environment for hundreds of thousands of 
years - half a m illion, fo r safety. This poses the 
unprecedented problem of finding a storage 
which will not be disturbed by the geological 
processes that occur over such a time span. 
Research has not yet proved that such storage 
exists.
Here, once again, an issue of sheer survival 
is involved, in the struggle to prevent such 
irresponsibility towards future generations.
The nuclear industry has generally treated 
critics with disdain, making concessions to 
them reluctantly and only after public opinion 
has been roused. But in recent years, some of 
the more far-sighted proponents of nuclear 
power have started to recognise the strength 
of the opposition’s case, particularly in the 
area of ‘nuclear malevolence’. Their proposals 
for coping with nuclear hazards constitute in 
themselves an equally ominous political and 
social threat.
Thus the US Atomic Energy Commission 
has proposed a special federal police force 
devoted to the security of plutonium plants 
and shipments. It has complained of recent 
court rulings protecting individual privacy, 
and requested legislation which would 
facilitate security checks on nuclear industry 
personnel. (10)
With the projected growth of the industry, 
the number of workers affected by such 
restrictions of civil rights could run into the
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millions. Already, according to the New York 
Times Texas state police keep dossiers on 
opponents of nuclear plants. (11)
The dangers involved here should not be 
underestimated. A few kilograms of plutonium 
make an ideal weapon for blackmailing a 
whole city, since it effectively disperses itself 
in small particles once exposed to the air.
Even graver is the real possibility of 
constructing a nuclear bomb from plutonium 
in a reactor's waste; impurities would make it 
in e ffic ie n t but, as an expe rim en t has 
convincingly shown, little skill would be 
needed to achieve a weapon with the 
destructive force of about 100 tons of TNT. 
(12) This would be within the capacity of 
‘amateurs’; any government with nuclear 
power plants would have the facilities to 
manufacture weapons 100 times more deadly. 
After an extortion threat, whether successful 
or not, an atmosphere of hysteria could well be 
envisaged, in which authoritarian ‘law and 
order’ proposals would be d ifficu lt to combat. 
They would even have a certain rationality, 
inside a globally irrational context.
III. The Many Levels of Irrationality
The risks just outlined justify the verdict that 
a major development of nuclear power is 
irrational, if our criterion is the welfare of 
humanity. But this is far from the only sense in 
which we can just apply the epithet ‘irrational’ 
to capitalism’s nuclear perspectives.
It should first be appreciated that the current 
nuclear program is not a long-term solution to 
the problems of power generation, even in the 
opinion of capitalism ’s own analysts. It is 
projected as merely bridging the gap between 
the present period marked by dim inishing 
stocks of oil, and the situation in perhaps three 
decades or so, when alternative sources of 
energy will be commercially viable. The 
tapping of the sun’s energy is one important 
such alternative, to which capitalism is now 
be la ted ly  s ta rting  to  devote increased 
research and development funds. The primary 
aim here is to find ways of reducing the capital 
costs of large-scale solar power plants.
For reasons discussed below, solar power is 
still seen as less attractive than fusion pow er- 
a variety of nuclear plant working on a 
different principle from the current models. 
Existing ‘fission’ reactors rely on a controlled 
version of the nuclear reaction - the ‘sp litting ’
of a heavy atom such as uranium or plutonium
- which in its convulsive release produced the 
explosion of the Hiroshima bomb. A ‘fusion’ 
reactor would be based on taming the nuclear 
reaction underlying the hydrogen bomb, in 
which light elements ‘fuse’ together to form a 
heavier element. Steady progress is being 
made in the research on controlled fusion, 
particularly since a Soviet break-through in 
this field some years ago - the ‘Tokomak’ 
development. It is generally believed however, 
that several decades w ill elapse before 
commercial fusion reactors enter into service, 
even after a basic design has proved itself in 
the laboratory.
Thus, present nuc lea r program s are 
supposed to justify themselves by their 
contribution to power needs in the next few 
decades. But it is precisely in this short term 
that there arise the most serious doubts of the 
program’s utility.
In the first place, the cost of a unit of nuclear­
generated electricity is claimed to be now 
competitive with, and (in the USA at least) 
even cheaper than, the cost when oil or coal is 
used as in conventional power stations. But it 
is well known that this competitiveness is 
based on comparatively cheap fuel costs, 
using uranium extracted economically from 
high-grade ore; and the estimated world 
supplies of this ore fall far short of the fuel 
needs over the lifetimes of the reactors now 
planned. (13)
Once the reserves of this ore are exhausted, 
uranium must be mined from the low-grade 
reserves - containing perhaps 30 or 40 times 
less metal per ton. This could double the cost 
of nuclear-generated electricity, and destroy 
its commercial viability.
The remedies hoped for by the industry are 
all either ineffective or highly speculative. 
Plutonium could be extracted from reactor 
wastes and used as fresh fuel; but this would 
‘stretch’ the supply only by a matter of 15 per 
cent or so, while m ultiplying enormously the 
dangers associated with plutonium handling.
(14) Improvement in extraction methods might 
lower the cost of treating the low-grade ore; 
but the improvements would need to be 
qualitative. Escalating oil prices might keep 
level with increased uranium price; but no 
such rise can be anticipated fo r coal.
The industry’s major hope here lies in the 
breeder reactor, whose operating core is
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wrapped in a 'blanket’ of natural uranium. 
Such a reactor w ill convert the bulk of this 
uranium into a suitable fuel (normally, less 
than one per cent of it is available), thus 
producing (or ‘breeding’) more fuel than it 
uses up. The world supplies of 'burnable’ 
uranium could thus be effectively increased 
perhaps seventy times over.
*
Before agreeing with the US administration 
that breeder reactors thus represent the 
solution to the nuclear fuel shortage, some 
facts should be noted. The inherent dangers of 
the breeder reactor vastly exceed those of the 
current models, and justify the greater 
concern and opposition of aware scientists.
(15) A whole series of technical difficulties 
have resulted in repeated postponements of 
the expected date o f ope ra tion  of a 
commercial breeder, the latest estimate 
(probably optim istic) now landing in the 
1990s. The significantly higher capital costs, 
as compared to today’s power stations, are 
likely to result in yet more delays before the 
buying reluctance of electrical utilities is 
overcome. And even then, a breeder w ill take 
somewhere between 20 to 40 years to produce 
enough fuel for one reactor.
Thus, reliance on the advent of breeders to 
‘stretch’ fuel supplies represents a dubious 
gamble. Yet what the industry is thereby 
g a m b lin g  o n , is  th e  w h o le  c o s t -  
competitiveness of nuclear power.
It is irrationality of another sort which 
emerges here: the nuclear program is not even 
rational on capitalism’s own criterion of cost 
efficiency. Reactors already planned are not 
assured of a fuel supply which can keep them 
competitive. Thousands of billions of dollars 
are to be invested in the hope that something 
will turn up ....
Even with the cheap uranium supply 
available today, the industry can establish the 
competitiveness of new plants only by 
ignoring well-established trends, that would 
send the price of nuclear-generated electricity 
skyrocketing. The most important of these 
trends are, firstly, the staggering escalation in 
the capital cost of nuclear plants, and 
secondly, the severe drop in efficiency of 
nuclear plants after about five years’ running.
In May 1975, the Friends of the Earth showed 
how w oe fu lly  the re levant u t i l i ty  had 
underestimated costs, when they testified 
against the proposed Rancho Seco 2 reactor
near Sacramento (California). Adopting 
realistic figures for capital cost, interest rates 
and capacity factor (i.e. efficiency), and for 
o p e r a t i o n ,  m a in t e n a n c e  a n d  
decom m iss ion ing , the FOE ca lcu la tio n  
showed that the true costs of a unit of power 
was nearly four times the figure submitted by 
the utility. (16)
A study by the Grenoble Institute has shown 
that, in France, nuclear-generated electricity 
cannot compete with oil at today’s prices. In 
the heating of a household, for example, we 
can deduce from the study that oil will be 
cheaper so long as its price remains below $45 
a barrel (price in mid-1975: $11). (17)
The escalation in capital cost (we consider 
its explanation later) shows no sign of abating. 
Of course, that of coal-fired plants also shows 
an increasing trend, but nothing like as severe
- a 1975 study estimated that the difference in 
price between a coal and a nuclear plant was 
itself increasing by $19 per kilowatt per year.
(18) In other words: every year the price of a 
1000-megawatt nuclear plant leaps another 
$19 million above that of its coal-burnina rival
The curves of capacity factor against reactor 
age also show a dismal trend: that the 
efficiency is low and becoming even lower.
(19) A ll th is  may make the nuclear 
commitment seem extraordinary enough; but 
we have no t yet m entioned the most 
as ton ish ing  ir ra tio n a lity  of a ll. Some 
preliminary remarks are needed:
The power output of a generator of any sort 
can never represent pure gain, since some 
power is inevitably consumed in building and 
running it. In the case of a nuclear reactor, a 
great deal of power is required merely to set up 
in business - to build the station, m ineand mill 
the initial fuel supply, etcetera. A most 
important part of this power input occurs at the 
stage where natural uranium is treated so as to 
increase the fraction of it which can be ‘burnt’ 
as fuel - the ‘enrichment’ process.
All this means that the station will be running 
for some time before it has ‘paid back’ the 
pow er used to set it in to  ope ra tion . 
Calculations of the ‘break-even’ time have 
been carried out for various reactor designs; 
they indicate that about two years of normal 
operation will be needed to repay the power 
input for construction.
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Now consider the effect of a rapid nuclear 
program , with the number of reactors 
doubling every few years. To see this effect, let 
us adopt some definite, (though fictitious) 
figures: suppose a reactor’s ‘pay-back’ time is 
one year (this is unrealistically low), and that 
the number of reactors is doubling every year 
(this is unrealistically fast). Suppose also that 
a reactor takes a year to build (instead of the 
actual six to nine years).
In year one, no reactors are operating but 
one is being built: so no power is produced, 
but one year’s output is consumed. In year 
two, one reactor is operating, but two are 
under construction; so one year's output is 
produced but two are consumed. In yearthree 
three reactors are operating but fourare being 
built; so three years’ output is produced, but 
four are consumed ....
If the calculation is continued, it will be 
found that the program uses up more power 
than it produces in every year of its operation.
Of course, in the real world such a program 
must come to a halt at somestage; the number 
of reactors cannot go on doubling each year 
indefinitely. It is at this point that the nuclear 
industry will become a nett power producer, 
but until then, it will actually be a nett 
consum er of power.
In the real world, also, the figures are not as 
they are given in the example. But the effect 
still persists, in a modified form, even after we 
insert the correct data for power input during 
construction, power output in operation and 
building time. We still find that the program 
will not ‘break even’, in the sense of producing 
more power than it consumes, for a certain 
number of years.
Just how many years will depend on a 
number of factors: the type of reactor, its 
operating efficiency, the grade of ore mined, 
the power consumed in regular operation. But 
the most detailed calculations available, (20) 
suggest that, inserting the figures appropriate 
to current programs, this ‘break-even’ time can 
easily be upwards of fifteen years, or even 
twenty.
But this is precisely the period in which the 
nuclear program is supposed to compensate 
for the exhaustion of oil supplies, while the 
world awaits the arrival of fresh powersources 
.... In other words, the nuclear program will 
quite possibly consume more power than it 
produces, in the very period when it is 
supposed to be the key factor in power 
generation!
THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR POWER 9
It should be pointed out that a program with 
oil - and coal-burning stations substituted for 
nuclear, but expanding just as quickly, would 
make an even worse showing. It is the sheer 
speed of the projected construction programs 
which determines their short-term energy 
inefficiency. But of course, no one plans to 
build conventional power stations at such a 
breakneck pace - since no one has the illusion 
that such a program would solve any ‘energy 
crisis’. This illusion attaches only to plans for 
nuclear power stations, when one ‘forgets’ the 
energy needed to build them; to puncture the 
illusion, the sort of energy analysis sketched 
above is required.
Before arriving at an overall judgment on 
capitalism’s nuclear project, we should 
appreciate the element of uncertainty which 
runs through the above analyses. Some of the 
needed data - what fresh reserves of uranium 
will be discovered for instance, or what long­
term efficiency (capacity factor) w ill be 
achieved by nuclear stations - can only be 
estimated. Some of the relevant calculations 
require time and manpower that have not yet 
been devoted to them, so that only suggestive 
approximations are available.
However, this very absence of reliable 
information is itself highly revealing. Let us 
adopt some of the criteria advanced, within a 
framework of capitalist assumption, for 
implementing a new technology and consider 
how they are met in the case of nuclear power. 
Let us see what preconditions should be 
fulfilled to justify the investment of capital 
involved:
First, the safety of the new industry should 
be sufficiently guaranteed, as to obviate the 
risk of the whole development being aborted at 
some future date. (This would occur, for 
example, as a sequel to the catastrophic 
release of radioactive material, by a plant 
accident or malevolent design. The public 
reaction could well make it politically 
impossible to continue operation of the 
existing plants, and force the abandonment of 
the large amounts of capital they represented.)
Secondly, the programs adopted should 
actually achieve their declared goals: that is, to 
produce significantly more power than they 
consume, in the vital period of the next few 
decades.
Thirdly, the electricity produced should be 
competitive in cost with that generated by 
‘conventional’ (oil - or coal-fired) stations.
Fourthly, plants should not be projected 
unless they are guaranteed a suitable supply 
of fuel over their working lifetime.
Fifthly, the financial mechanisms should 
exist that will enable the ‘consumer’ (i.e. the 
electrified utilities) to obtain the capital 
needed to buy the reactors concerned.
It is when we review these reasonable 
criteria that there emerges the full irrationality 
o f capitalism’s nuclear plans: it has not been 
demonstrated that they satisfy a single one of 
these basic requirements.
At best, the nuclear industrialists can be 
regarded as undertaking a colossal gamble. 
They are gambling that no catastrophic 
accident w ill occur in the short term, despite 
the narrow squeaks already in the record. 
They are gambling that fresh high-grade ore 
reserves, or a technically and commercially 
viable breeder reactor, will be available in time. 
They are gambling that the trend to ever- 
higher capital costs, and the decline with age 
In the efficiency of the functioning reactors, 
w i l l  be re v e rs e d , o r e c o n o m ic a lly  
compensated for by increased cost of 
conventional fuels ....
In the USA, they are even gambling that 
‘something will turn up' in the way of finance, 
to permit the purchase of reactors by the 
electrical utilities. (Early in 1975, some 60 per 
cent of reactor orders in the USA had been 
cancelled or postponed mainly because of the 
refusal of finance houses to lend the purchase 
money. (21)
It is true that capitalist enterprises have been 
known to ‘gamble’ before this - to spend on 
research and development, o rto  launch on the 
production of a new commodity whose market 
was not assured. But we remind the reader of 
the sums involved in this particular gamble: a 
thousand billion dollars, or thereabouts, in the 
remainder of this century, in the United States 
alone.
It would be easy to conclude that the gods of 
history, with the destruction of capitalism high 
on their agenda, are staging their proverbial 
prologue of induced lunacy. But a pat verdict 
of ‘guilty but insane', even if supported by the 
evidence, hardly goes far enough; it is also 
necessary to understand. The attempt to
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reach even a partia l understand ing  is 
mandatory, and not only because of the 
importance of the nuclear program in itself, 
both economically and politically. There is 
another issue involved: that of the dynamic of 
the capitalist economy in the present period. It 
may be that the nuclear industry can serve as a 
paradigm, showing in not-so-small-miniature
- the emergence of new trends or changes in 
the relative weight of ones already known.
IV. The Energy Com pany’s Gamble
There are few industries, even today, as 
heavily monopolised as the nuclear industry. 
When one says ‘pressurised-water reactor’, 
one says Westinghouse; and ‘boiling-water 
reactor’ likewise means General Electric. And 
these two types, built by two giants directly or 
through subsidiaries and licensing agents 
throughout the capitalist world, account for 
over 80 per cent of the reactors already built, 
under construction or on order. (41)
The p o w e r fu l p re s s u re  o f th e s e  
multinational corporations exerts itself even 
on those countries possessing their own 
proven reactor designs. Thus Francis Perrin, 
formerly the French high commissioner for 
atomic energy, has recently complained of the 
‘monolithism ’ of the French nuclear program 
(even while rubbishing the anti-nuclear 
cam paign as “ based on to ta lly  fa lse 
assertions” and on declarations ‘‘devoid of all 
objective value” ). He recalls General de 
Gaulle’s decision (December 12, 1967) to 
proceed with the construction of two large 
reactors of a French design (graphite­
moderated, gas-cooled, fuelled by natural 
uranium) that has elsewhere proved itself. The 
blocking of this decision he lays to the account 
only of some unnamed highly-placed civil 
servants, also responsible for the present plan 
to instal ‘almost exclusively’ the pressurised- 
water reactors of .... Westinghouse.
He calls, but w ithout much apparent faith in 
the likelihood of success, for the French 
program to include more ‘diversification’, a 
feature not sufficiently provided by the present 
inclusion of some boiling-water reactors from 
.... General Electric. (22)
The weight of the multinationals has been 
felt even in Britain, the country whose own 
design of gas-cooled reactor pioneered the 
commercial generation of nuclear electricity. 
Hot debate raged in the last year, after the 
Central Electricity Generating Board and the
N a tio n a l N u c le a r  C o rp o ra t io n  b o th  
recommended a switch to the American light- 
water reactor. But under intensive questioning 
before a House of C om m ons Select 
Committee, they were unable to justify their 
recommendations, and the government 
decided not to switch - for the time being, at 
least.
The revelations from Lockheed and other 
firms have made notorious one of the 
processes by which the multinationals 
‘conquer’ foreign markets: old-fashioned 
bribery of influential natives. It should not be 
assumed, however, that this is always the 
predominant factor. Sheer size counts for a 
great deal - as illustrated in the unhappy case 
of the design of an international computing 
language. The world's experts agreed on a 
suitable language, and devoted much effort to 
its elaboration. But their eugenic offspring, 
Algol, runs a very poor second in its breadth of 
social acceptance to the inferior language, 
Fortran - which was born with asilverspoon in 
its mouth, sired by the market-dominating IBM
In another d ire c tio n , a s till vaster 
oligopolistic structure is shaping up, as the 
leading o il com panies com p le te  th e ir 
transformation into what has been accurately 
described as ‘energy companies’. Already in 
1971, the oil giants were responsible for the 
milling of some 40 per cent of US uranium; 
their coal production amounted to 20 per cent 
of the US total, and their acquisition of coal 
reserves guaranteed their future dominance in 
the industry (one oil company alone - Humble
- was the nation’s second largest coal owner). 
In the nuclear field, Gulf Oil (with the third 
largest assets - about $9 billion - of any oil 
company) had set up Gulf General Atomic. 
(23)
This latter company threatens Britain’s lead 
in gas-cooled reactors, and already in 1972 
there was "consternation in the nuclear 
industry" as a consequence, according to one 
writer. (24) Gulf promises delivery of high- 
temperature gas reactors (an advanced 
design) around 1980.
But if this represents competition with the 
dominant light-water American reactors, is 
similar consternation apparent among the 
ruling giants? Hardly; the chairman of Gulf 
General Atomic, E. Prockett, happens to sit on 
the Board of Westinghouse also.
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A thrust towards monopolisation is built into 
the nuclear project. A single plant of today’s 
typical size - a thousand megawatts of 
electrical power - costs upwards of half a 
billion dollars, and smaller units are neither 
readily available nor called for in quantity. 
Companies with assets not running into the 
billions can hardly hope for a sizeable share of 
such a market, nor risk the investments 
needed to establish themselves.
The dynamic of capitalism ’s nuclear project 
has been spelled out - with some naive 
admiration - by Simon Rippon, the editor of a 
technical journal noted for its fervent, not to 
say fanatical, nuclear partisanship:
.... The big industrial concerns have not entered 
the business for quick profits - indeed, most of the 
companies that have entered the nuclear business 
around the world have been shaken to their 
foundations by losses on early projects and few can 
see dramatic profits in the future. For the supply is 
going to be increasingly in the direction of nuclear 
power and therefore for the wellbeing of their 
company they must establish a foothold in this 
sector of the business in spite of the heavy initial 
costs. (25)
It may be doubted whether the 'foothold' is 
being seized as reluctantly as Rippon makes it 
sound. For the larger giants, nuclear power 
spells centralisation, size, growth. The 
prospect before them is an intoxicating one: 
the power industry swollen to a size unheard 
of, its relative weight in the economy 
enhanced several times over, and all of it 
within the grasp of one or two amicably- 
coexisting combines ....
The power industry as a whole can of course 
anticipate an increase in its relative share of 
the gross national product, since the power 
needs of industrial capitalist society grow 
faster than the GNP itself. In Japan, for 
instance, official projections are for a growth 
of four per cent in the GNP, compared to 6.2 
per cent for the electrical output. (26) Using 
this data, a simple calculation shows that the 
proportion of the GNP represented by 
electricity output (i.e. its relative weight in the 
economy) will be double what it is now, in a 
little over 30 years.
It is only this perspective which can explain 
the gambles they are taking, and pressuring 
governments to take. They are not really 
gambling that no catastrophes will occur, that 
no hitches will hold up the breeder reactor
when it is needed, that the nuclear project will 
remain cost-competitive.
What they are really gambling on - and from 
their viewpoint, it is a ‘rational’ risk to take - is 
that their economic and especially their 
political weight in society will be so massive, 
that society has no option but to make their 
bets come home.
It is the next decade which is crucial for this 
outcome. By 1985, the nuclear share in 
electricity production is designed to reach, in 
the leading capitalist countries, the 10 percent 
level or close to it (the USA, 13 per cent; the 
EEC, 17 per cent; France, 30 per cent).
Within the present structure of industrial 
capitalism, it is hard to envisage a situation in 
which such proportions of the power supply 
could simply be switched off, no matter how 
powerful the arguments in terms of human 
welfare or even of economic efficiency.
Perhaps a ca tas troph ic  ‘m e lt-d o w n ’, 
releasing millions of curios of radioactivity, 
killing tens of thousands of people, damaging 
property to the extent of billions of dollars? 
Studies by the American Atomic Energy 
Commission have shown that accidents could 
well have such a scope. (27) But if society 
really depends on the nuclear branch of its 
power industry in order to continue along its 
accustomed path, and if this path can still 
c la im  an overa ll acceptance, then an 
alternative to a shut-down would be the 
adoption  of ‘firm  m easures’, a lleged ly  
ensuring that such disasters could not recur.
Such measures, whose shape was sketched 
in the AEC report mentioned earlier, would be 
repressive and authoritarian in the extreme; 
and there can be little doubt that among the 
movements heavily repressed would be any 
spreading panic or mobilising action in 
connection with nuclear pow er....
But if nuclear power reveals itself as 
unarguably wasteful? Suppose the tendencies 
for nuclear plants to decline in efficiency with 
age, and to require more and more capital for 
their construction, become so pronounced 
that, on economic grounds, they should 
simply be replaced by non-nuclear methods of 
power generation. Would not this be a 
situation disastrous to the nuclear industry, 
one in which their gamble had definitively 
failed?
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Possibly - if they allowed such a situation to 
arise. But as a Harvard-MIT study pointed out 
in the Technology Review:
The price of usable energy from oil, coal or 
uranium now has little to do w ith the marginal 
production cost of any of these resources.... Instead 
the price of energy from alternative technologies is 
the result of a complicated process of assigning 
relative values to a variety of energy-producing 
resources and technologies by those who either 
control or require these resources and technologies. 
This process is both intensely and inherently 
political.
In assessing the degree of control over 
energy prices, it is vital to realise that we are 
not dealing with an isolated handful of reactor 
manufacturers - more and more, the Energy 
Company becomes a powerful reality, and the 
relative pricing of the various methods of 
electricity generation falls increasingly under 
its control. 'Free competition’ between the 
various primary fuels started to lose its reality 
many years ago, as the oil companies moved 
over into the mining of coal, of uranium, into 
the processing of uranium and - through 
subsidiaries and affiliates - into the building of 
reactors. Their influence will be exerted to fix 
prices that reflect, not the resultant of 
competitive forces, and not the realities of 
cost-effectiveness, but simply the interests of 
their own needs forexpansion, investment and 
profit.
Thus, if the nuclear industry is gambling, it 
knows in advance that the dice will be loaded 
in its favor. And even if its luck turns 
unexpectedly bad, and the table runs against it 
incessantly, there remains a further and 
decisive recourse: it can have a word with the 
management ....
Consumerist capitalism needs the power 
industry; it even needs its continuous and 
sizeable  expansion . The state w hich  
administers that system never runs on the 
basis of one-capitalist-one-vote, or even one- 
m illio n -d o lla rs -o n e -v o te ; a lways some 
animals in that particular jungle play the role of 
the king of beasts. The Energy Company, 
more than half nuclearised by the turn of the 
century, will certainly supply a king or two, 
perhaps even a king of k ings. Such 
personages do not need to fear bankruptcy, or 
even a missed dividend. If even the smaller 
predators like Lockheed, Boeing or Grumann 
can depend on sympathetic intervention by 
the state in their hour of need, what w ill be 
beyond the power of the Energy Company?
indeed, nuclear power has already benefited 
crucially from state support, and not only in 
the b illio n s  lavished on research and 
development, whose results the corporations 
simply take over. Another important parcel of 
‘aid’ has been delivered by the US government 
plants enriching uranium. The Westinghouse 
and GE reactors require fuel that has passed 
through this expensive process, and their 
success in penetrating the market is due in no 
small measure to the artific ia lly low price 
assured by what amounts to a concealed state 
subsidy; an advantage which has not gone 
unnoticed by their competitors:
Ned Franklin, chairman and managing director of 
Britain’s Nuclear Power Company .... maintains that 
the price of uranium enrichment is now fixed by 
essentially political considerations. Enrichment is 
dominated by the US which supplies most of the 
enrichment requirements of the western world. 
According to people working in the US’s nuclear 
industry, the prevailing price of enrichment is about 
half what it would be if the industry had to build new 
facilities and operate them at a profit. The problem is 
that enrichment is subsidised by the use of old plant 
that was paid for as part of the weapons programme; 
enrichment plants are supplied with subsidised 
electricity; and there is no charge fo r research and 
development. (29)
With such marks of favor already acquired, 
there seems little that the Energy Company 
needs to fear - unless, of course, it confronts 
an enemy whom even the state must treat with 
caution. As we will later see, such an enemy 
indeed exists ....
V. Creating the Objective Facts’
The socialist movement has suffered for 
many generations from the illusion that 
techno logy  is va lue-free . A dop tin g  a 
misleading schema in which an essentially 
non-political ‘base’ (the forces of production) 
is simply to be taken over and endowed with a 
different ‘superstructure’ (socialist relations of 
production), it has failed to appreciate the 
political content of that technological base.
Even Lenin is on record as succumbing to 
this error, when he went so far as to laud the 
Taylor system (time and motion study) and 
urge its adoption in the Soviet Union. It should 
be noted that a question mark must now be put 
over the ‘technological rationality’ of the 
assembly-line method itself; can it really be 
justified even on the narrow criterion of 
‘stepping up production’? This most alienating
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of all technological practices needs re­
examination in the light of recent industrial 
experiments (particularly in Sweden) based 
on a self-managed working team, ratherthan a 
single worker permanently assigned to one 
stultifying operation on the line.
T h a t te c h n o lo g y , and th e  lin e  of 
development of technology, are alike political, 
is nowhere more evident today than in 
capitalism's nuclear project. It is illuminating 
to consider the non-nuclear alternatives for 
power supply, their undesirability from 
monopoly capital’s viewpoint, and the way that 
an apparen tly  inev itab le  te ch n o lo g ica l 
progress along nuclear lines is actually the 
result of highly political decisions.
A source of nuclear power has supplied 
mankind with the overwhelming bulk of its 
energy throughout history; it is the sun, a giant 
reactor successfully employing the fusion 
process w ithout pollution and without wasting 
non-renewable fuel reserves (over a time scale 
of several billions of years, at any rate). 
Serious studies of the w orld 's  energy 
problems almost invariably urge the priority of 
research and development in the field of solar 
power as the most attractive prospect for 
mankind.
But it might be asked: how real is this 
prospect of solar power? What are the 
technological data on its practicability as a 
large-scale resource? How does its level of 
development compare with other energy 
resources, and what is its promise in the short 
term?
Questions such as these are posed at the 
wrong level; they seek as answers a recital of 
bare’ technological data, not themselves 
embodying politico-econom ic decisions, but 
supplying the value-free facts on which such 
decisions can be based. It is true thatthere are 
circumstances (very restricted, and usually of 
lit t le  socia l in te res t) in w hich  such a 
dichotomy of fact and value has a relative 
validity; but the present questions are not 
located in a context even remotely appropriate 
to such a division.
Large-scale nuclear reactors actually exist; 
nuclear power moved out of the laboratory 
many decades ago, into the province of the 
architect and the engineer. Large-scale solar 
plants, on the contrary, remain in the 
anteroom of research and development. Isthis 
a bare' technological fact? Only in the most
abstract sense; in the real world, the genesis, 
understanding and future implications of this 
‘fact’ must be sought in the sphere of political
economy.
For there is no autonomous, independently- 
evolving sphere of 'technological progress' 
which thus made nuclear plants arrive before 
solar. Nuclear technology was developed in 
response to conscious decisions on the 
allocation of manpower and funds, inspired 
originally by the search for more destructive 
weapons, and later by the attractiveness for 
monopoly capitalism of the peculiar qualities 
of nuclear power.
The failure to allocate corresponding 
resources to solar power research was the 
complementary decision that helped to create 
the ‘technological facts’ asthey now exist. And 
of course, similar remarks can be made about 
projects to tap the earth's subterranean heat 
(geothermal power) or to utilise the tides.
Thus the facts are purely technological only 
in abstraction, inside a conceptual schema 
that isolates from its social context an abstract 
history of ‘technological progress'. In the 
concrete world of things as they have been and 
as they are, these facts are born already 
'dressed' in a political-economic penumbra 
that accompanies them always, determines 
their significance and points to their future 
possibilities.
This can be seen very clearly, when we 
consider the prospects of solar power vis-a-vis 
nuclear, over the next couple of decades. The 
'facts’ involved here are being created right 
now, and a glance at US budgetary allocations 
will show us what facts the Energy Company 
hopes to bring about: for every dollar spent 
this year on solar research, more than eight 
dollars will be spent on one nuclear project 
alone - the breeder reactor. (30)
It is not hard to understand why monopoly 
capital is so lukewarm towards solar power. 
The la tte r lends its e lf adm irab ly  to 
d ece n tra lisa tion , sm all ins ta lla tio ns , a 
minimum investment of capital; these are fatal 
flaws from the viewpoint of the giant 
corporation. The technical' advantages - 
inexhaustible energy supply, absence of 
pollution, longevity of the installation, low 
maintenance expenses - cannot compensate 
for these inbuilt deficiencies .... It has been 
well said that solar power would fare very 
differently if only General Electric could buy 
the sun!
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The sad fact is, however, that solar leases 
are not yet open to takeover bids; and so the 
corporations are doing the next best thing: 
planning to build their own sun .... For there is 
some corporation interest in solar power, 
provided the inbuilt vices just mentioned can 
be eliminated, and the project made capital- 
intensive, large-scale, highly centralised. 
These are precisely the qualities of the 
Satellite Solar Power Station, emanating from 
Arthur D. Little Inc., Grumann, Raytheon and 
Textron. A giant satellite a kilometre across 
will absorb sunlight, convert it to microwave 
radiation and beam it down to a seven- 
kilometre receiver on the Earth’s surface, 
generating from three to fifteen times the 
output of a single large nuclear plant.... (31)
In principle, the solar power source can be a 
highly flexible device, adaptable in size to 
meet a wide range of demand and providing 
access to power for the most isolated 
community. A minimum of capital investment 
can provide a self-sufficient source for an 
ind e fin ite  period , and one un ique ly  
compatible with ecological requirements.
These features can hardly be recognised in 
the satellite project, which achieves the near­
impossible: a solar power source demanding 
an enormous capital investment, suitable for 
insertion into only the very largest national 
electricity grids, taking no advantage of solar 
radiation's great suitability fo r direct heating 
of homes and workplaces, and delivering, with 
its giant receiving antennae, an insult to the 
environment on a new and monstrous scale.
We do monopoly capital an injustice then, if 
we evaluate its nuclear program as nothing 
more than a technological project. Quite apart 
from its inherent hazards to humanity, its 
a d o p t i o n  w o u ld  t h e n  b e c o m e  
incomprehensible in view of the serious 
doubts as to nett energy production, security 
of investment, reliability of fuel supply and 
cost-competitiveness. But actually it must be 
seen as a project in a much wider sense: 
namely, as a social project, predicated upon a 
definite social structure and aiming to develop 
that structure in a definite direction.
The social structure concerned is that of 
capitalism in its consumerist phase, where a
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widening gap between a potential of self­
managed fu lf ilm e n t, and a rea lity  of 
hierarchical repression - is papered over with a 
p o lic y  o f c o n s u m e r is t  c o n c e s s io n s . 
Destruction of the environment is im plicit in 
such a society; this connection has been 
analysed in some detail elsewhere, and will not 
be further discussed here. (32)
The power needs of such a society are vast 
and ever increasing, and it indeed faces a 
‘crisis’ in the prospect of exhaustion of oil 
reserves, combined with a severe pollution 
problem from coal-burning power sources. 
But, for reasons which will be clear from the 
discussion above, the giant corporations 
which dominate its technical development can 
hardly be enthusiastic about the rational lines 
of solution advocated even by its own experts: 
elimination of wasteful energy consumption, 
reduction in the growth of the electrical power 
industry, development of alternative sources 
such as solar, geothermal and tidal power.
It is true that nuclear power, too, has its 
disadvantages - it may, for example, weaken 
the fabric of social control by the destructive 
or blackmailing opportunities it creates for 
dissident groups. But in lending itself to 
centralisation, expansion and domination by a 
few industrial giants, it accords well with the 
dynamic of consumerist capitalism - which 
would be hard put to accommodate policies of 
energy conservation and the strangling of 
growth.
Of course, the system will have to adjust 
itself to the peculiarities of this new power 
source. The Energy Company may have to 
distort market and pricing mechanisms more 
g ro tesque ly  s till, to  nudge a long the 
consumption of nuclear-generated electricity 
and the purchase of nuclear reactors. Massive 
and direct state intervention may be required 
to ensure the industry’s future, with the 
perhaps grudging consent, or even against the 
opposition, of industrialists in other sectors. 
And measures of social discipline w ill almost 
certainly be called for, restricting civil rights 
and lim itin g  the a c tiv it ie s  of p ro test 
movements, to provide the safeguards needed 
once society depends fo r its life-blood - 
electrical power - on one or two thousand 
in c re d ib ly  po isonous sources. Such 
expectations may well appear repugnant, but 
they cannot be dubbed fantastic; they are 
so lid ly  based on ex is tin g  values and 
assumptions, those which demand the
constant expansion of the commodity market 
and, to an even greater extent, of electricity 
output.
But these values and assumptions do not go 
u n c h a lle n g e d , and th e re  is n o th in g  
fatalistically inevitable about the scenario 
sketched above. We have been looking at the 
political economy of capitalism today; but a 
different political economy is also shaping 
itself, already in conflict with its older rival and 
by no means invariably vanquished. We must 
now look at ihe forces behind this alternative 
view, take note of their accomplishments up to 
the present and estimate their possibilities in 
the future.
VI. The Political Economy of Contestation
After seeing how powerful is its support both 
corporative and State, we might expect the 
nuclear industry to glow with health and 
optimism. But the facts are, surprisingly, quite 
otherwise.
Things can’t get worse, or can they?’ was 
the gloomy title of an editorial in Nuclear News 
(April 1975). The New York Times (Nov. 16, 
1975) summed up the m ajortroubles in astory 
headlined: ‘Hopeforcheap powerfrom atom  is 
fading’. The annual conference of the nuclear 
industry in November 1975 convened with 
over 100 nuclear plant orders cancelled or 
delayed during the year; with Gulf O il’s 
subsidiary, General Atomic, announcing its 
close-down; and in a state described by one 
writer as ‘on the verge of panic’. (33)
Have some ‘bare’ economic facts thrust their 
way through the corporations’ screen of figure 
juggling and misrepresentation? Is nuclear 
power just too costly? .... Actually, the truth is 
far more complex - and more interesting - 
when one probes a little deeper.
Nuclear plants must be sited well away from 
the densely-populated areas that use their 
electricity. As Hohenemser points out (34), 
this entails a two-fold economic penalty: no 
consumers are nearby for the (significant) 
waste heat, and distribution costs are heavily 
increased. Furthermore, conservative (and 
costly) operating procedures are adopted to 
prevent possible accidents.
It is not hard to see that these ‘economic’ 
penalties derive from sources that can rightly 
be termed ‘political’: public suspicion of 
nuclear power, and the consequent support of
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activist intervention (to relocate plants, to 
raise standards of radiation exposure, to 
enforce higher and more costly safety 
criteria). Nor is this all:
Perhaps the most important single factor 
telling against the economic future of nuclear 
power is the continuing escalation in capital 
cost of the nuclear plants, as compared to 
coal-burning plants. The reasons for this 
escalation have been carefully analysed in 
Technology Review (February 1975) by Bupp 
(Harvard) and Derian, Donsimoni and Treitel 
(M.I.T.).
They find that total cost is strongly 
correlated with the length of the licensing 
period, i.e. the time elapsed before the plant is 
l ic e n s e d  by th e  A to m ic  E n e rg y  
Commission(AEC) to enter into operation. 
Under US law, citizens can “ intervene” , on 
safety, environmental and other grounds, to 
oppose the granting of the licence or secure its 
postponement.
It is this intervention process, they show, 
w hich ca rries  the re sp o n s ib ility  fo r 
prolongation of the licensing period and the 
correlated rise in capital costs:
“ The American administrative and judicial 
processes afford .... critics ample opportunity 
to  im p e d e  th e  r a te  o f  r e a c t o r  
c o m m e r c ia l is a t io n .  T h e  p r in c ip a l  
consequence has been d ram atic  cost 
increases. The extreme critics of nuclear 
power have been at least partially successful in 
their efforts to force a downward re-evaluation 
of the social value of reactor technology.
" .... The issue here is not merely technical or 
economical, but is inherently political: Present 
trends in nuclear reactor costs can be 
interpreted as the economic result of a 
fundamental debate on nuclear power w ithin 
the US community. Beyond its economic 
effects, the real issue of this debate is the 
social acceptability of nuclear power .... ”
(It should perhaps be recalled that critics of 
nuclear power are not free to hold up 
construction at will; they must show that the 
particular project fails to satisfy environmental 
requirements, existing radiation-release 
standards, AEC regulations .... And it is 
precisely this kind of deficiency that they have 
been able to establish, time and again.)
Perhaps the second most ominous trend for 
nuclear-power competitiveness, is that of
declining capacity factor (efficiency) as plants 
grow older. A detailed study of the reasons for 
this decline is still in progress, but some 
contributing factors are already apparent, 
which are associated with the radioactive 
dangers in a nuclear plant and the public 
consciousness of them. For instance, the 
discovery in September 1974 of cracks in the 
cooling pipes of a US reactor resulted in the 
shutting down (for inspection) of all reactors 
of the same type; this would hardly have been 
done in the case of conventional power 
stations. Nor would it have been done, in all 
probability, if the public were less inclined to 
associate danger with the word “ nuclear".
Unprecedented maintenance difficulties 
can arise in nuclear reactors; the simple 
welding of a crack becomes a large-scale 
operation in which hundreds of workers have 
to be deployed, when the crack occurs in a 
region of such high radioactivity that each 
worker can remain there for no longer than a 
few m inutes.... Here again, the long campaign 
which forced the AEC to tighten up its 
radiation standards, and the heightened 
public awareness which resulted, should not 
be overlooked as a relevant factor.
We see, then, that the Energy Company has 
not got the field to itself; there are other 
political choices and actions which are 
significantly affecting the “bare economic 
facts" of nuclear power production. And of 
course, their effect on the political decisions in 
this field is even more noticeable - as shown, 
for example, by the severe reduction in the 
Swedish nuclear program for the next decade 
(from fourteen reactors to two already 
mentioned above).
We will not go on to list the successes of the 
anti-nuclear campaign in such other countries 
as Japan; the above is enough to show that 
significant effects can be achieved. This is all 
the more remarkable, being given that most of 
the radical left, in most of these struggles, have 
followed a policy of more-or-less benevolent 
abstention ....
It would be premature, however, to celebrate 
the end of the nuclear nightmare. For 1975 was 
the year of the great backlash, when the 
nuclear forces mobilised their counter­
offensive on an international scale.
An unprecedented pro-nuclear rally was 
scheduled for May in Washington (37); a 
report of the European Nuclear Society
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m eeting in Paris in A p ril stressed its 
propagandist aspect (38); in distant Australia, 
the Atomic Energy Commission ran an 
internal study course to justify nuclear power; 
W e s tin g h o u s e  a s s ig n e d  a team  o f 
propagandists in Pittsburgh to the job of 
‘rebutting’ the environmentalists. (39).
In launching this propaganda offensive on a 
g loba l scale, the c o rp o ra tio n s  ta c it ly  
acknowledge how important to them are the 
nuclear programs, and how threatening is the 
level of mass suspicion. It is vital that the left 
equally appreciate these factors, participate 
wholeheartedly in the anti-nuclear campaign, 
and strengthen its connection with the overall 
struggle against an irrational social system.
But the left is hampered in fu lfilling this role 
by the misleading theory (among others 
discussed further on) that the technological 
sphere evolves autonomously, independent of 
political action. The philosophical defects in 
this view have been surveyed above; after 
considering the particular case of the nuclear 
power industry, we can see how woefully it 
fails to explain the facts and the dynamic of 
this major component of capitalist planning in 
the decades to come.
Of course, the traditional marxist view was 
rarely a pure 'technological determ inism’; but 
it was usually content with a mere mention of 
the existence of ‘reciprocal interaction’, or of 
the 'mutual interdependence’ of the various 
sectors of the socia l-‘to ta lity ’. The analysis 
itself, however, usually proceeded in a strictly 
one-way d ire c tio n , w ith  the p o lit ic a l 
exercising little if any direct influence on the 
technological or economic. *
It would be wrong to claim that this method 
has now lost all validity; but it is apparent that, 
in the case of nuclear power, it does not give 
even a good first approximation to the truth. It 
is hard to believe that this industry is just one 
special and exceptional case, when it looms so 
large in terms of economic significance and 
investment allocation. May we not rather be 
look ing  at a parad igm  of c a p ita lism ’s 
development in this present phase, with deep 
lessons for the left and its program of radical 
reconstruction?
Marxism separates itself decisively from all 
varieties of technological determinism by its 
standpoint of class analysis - it sees the 
technological sphere as effectual only after 
mediation through the prevailing class
interests. Now, the interests of the capitalist 
class cannot be summed up as simply the 
making of a fast buck. They include also the 
preservation of a structure of industry which 
will enable the capitalist system to continue; 
and it is precisely this continuance of the 
centralised, large-scale, ever-expanding 
economy, based on a market of 'created 
demand', which the environmental crises 
today put in serious doubt.
In this situation, the larger investment 
decisions must be seen as political decisions, 
in which the longer-term interests of the 
system take precedence over narrowly- 
conceived ‘economic’ interests. But as 
political acts they become vulnerable to the 
attacks of political opponents - a vulnerability 
which the outstandingly irrational nuclear 
industry knows only too well, as it nurses its 
wounds and lashes back ....
Thus, when intervening in struggles overthe 
shape of the economy, the left should not be 
hampered by any lingering compunctions, 
perhaps based on alleged lessons from the 
'Luddite' period, from the ‘utopian machine- 
wreckers’ (lessons which are revealed as 
obsolete by the facts above, and which were 
o fte n  h is to r ic a l ly  d u b io u s  a n y w a y ). 
Otherwise, they will be leaving unchallenged 
some of the m ost s ig n ific a n t p o litic a l 
decisions of the giant corporations, carrying 
immediate threats to the world of today and 
even sowing the seeds of disaster for 
humanity’s whole future.
VII. The USSR and the Third World
The analysis above is focused on the 
advanced capitalist countries, and should not 
be extrapolated beyond them. The other major 
sectors of the world merit a separate if briefer 
discussion.
With a total list of only 25 plants, including 
those under construction or on order, the 
nuclear program of the USSR is insignificant 
in comparison to that of the USA, which is 
some 15 times greater in power output. 
Indeed, France’s alone outstrips the Soviet's in 
capacity (by about 50 per cent). (41)
This lesser level of development is not to be 
explained by an initial technological lag - the 
first Soviet nuclear station opened in 1958, 
ahead of every other country in the world save 
one (Britain).
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Nor does it stem from any ideological 
aversion to nuclear power. Official Soviet 
doctrine sees no problem in the inherent 
centralised nature of nuclear power; no 
prob lem  in the superhum an standards 
demanded fo r safe operation in the long term; 
no problem in the disposal of radioactive 
wastes ....
Indeed, the absence of genuine public 
discussion on the issues involved in nuclear 
power has allowed the Soviet nuclear industry 
to “solve” its disposal problems w ith a 
breathtaking lightmindedness: high-level 
radioactive wastes are simply pumped under 
pressure into deep permeable zones. Thus 
they are irretrievable; and moreover, in 
insecure liquid form; and (because of the high 
pressure of the injection), a threat to the 
stability of the whole region; disposal methods 
with these objectionable features would never 
be permitted in the USA or Europe. (42)
In explaining the Soviet tardiness in nuclear 
development, one cannot overlook the 
abundance of its coal, oil and hydropower 
resources. But the absence of private 
ownership also seems relevant here, saving 
the USSR from some of the more spectacularly 
ir r a t io n a l fe a tu re s  o f c a p ita l is m ’s 
technological policies. At least, its power 
supply w ill not be shaped by the imperial 
adventures of an Energy Company ....
The situation of nuclear power in the Third 
World is of direct relevance to the controversy 
in the in d u s tr ia lly  advanced c a p ita lis t 
countries. For defenders of nuclear power 
there often rest their case on the needs of 
Third World countries; short of coal, faced 
with rising oil prices, and yet starved of energy 
for their economic take-off, their only hope, 
allegedly, is the power of the atom ....
This argument is either cynical or simply 
ignorant. A United Nations analysis has 
revealed the true situation, referring first to the 
Third World’s -
“ .... very poor infrastructure of technology 
and non-availability of trained mappower to 
handle the reactors and other nuclear plants. 
The probability of nuclear accidents and 
c o n s e q u e n t ly  o f d a n g e rs  to  hum an  
environment are bound to be far greater in 
these countries. Further it is doubtful whether 
those countries can afford to spend an 
additional $3-4 billion towards the foreign
exchange cost of nuclear facilities during the 
next 25 years which w ill be the years of 
financial stress in these countries arising 
from pressure of population and scarcity of 
food. Moreover, the small size of the national 
electric power grids can integrate only small 
nuclear power plants which are at present not 
being manufactured .... ”  (43)
This last point is at present vital: the leading 
corporations are simply not interested in 
building reactors small enough to fit Third 
World needs. And they appear to remain 
a d a m a n t d e s p ite  p le as  by n u c le a r  
protagonists in the specialist literature, and 
even by leading figures at the September 1974 
conference of the International Atom ic Energy 
Authority. (44)
Evidently, they prefer to fight one battle at a 
time. Once the developed “ heartland” has 
been conquered for nuclear power, it may be 
time to think of the outskirts.
The people of the Third World have no 
interest in speeding up the process of their 
"nuclearisation” ; the UN comments above 
show this clearly enough. Financially, the 
higher capital cost of nuclear plants would 
deepen their dependence on the imperialist 
countries, who are skilled in exacting a 
political price for “ development loans” . 
Technologically, an important part of their 
industry would be in the hands of metropolitan 
experts for several decades. Economically, 
even a medium-sized plant would usually 
constitute, by itself, a high degree of 
concentration of power supply; and favor a 
centralisation of industry and a grandiosity of 
construction squarely opposed to the real 
needs of the bulk of the population. (When the 
majority of the population have no access to a 
power point, the arrival of a nuclear plant can 
hardly do otherwise than distort the economy 
further. What benefits have flowed through to 
the mass of people in those underdeveloped 
countries already boasting muclear stations - 
Pakistan, India, Spain?)
VIII. The Role of the Left
In the campaign against nuclear power - as 
in most of the campaigns on environmental 
issues - it has been exceptional to find the 
political vanguards actually in the van. Those 
with a pro-Moscow orientation have usually 
endorsed nuclear power as whole-heartedly 
and irresponsibly as the Soviet bureaucracy
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itself. Otners have remained on the sidelines, 
or grudgingiy joined in at the rear, because of 
ideological suspicions about the movement's 
purity in general, and its com patibility with 
their program in particular.
In its most extreme form, this suspicion 
leads to a dismissal of the anti-nuclear 
struggle - indeed of environmentalist issues in 
g e n e ra l - as a tre n d y  m id d le -c la s s  
phenomenon that does not interest the 
working class, and hence is no concern of the 
true revolutionary, who w ill concentrate on the 
real issues: those at the point of production 
and in the realm of state power.
Such a class characterisation of the 
environmentalist movement has greater 
d ifficulty reconciling itself with the facts now, 
than it might have had a few years ago; a 
weakness more serious still, is the implied 
judgment of an issue, not on its merits as a 
valid transitional demand, but on its present 
level of working class penetration.
It might be worth pointing out how neatly 
this attitude reverses the approach to social 
problems that was typical of Karl Marx. 
Absorbed above all else by humanity’s need 
for the overthrow of capitalism, Marx had an 
eagle eye - w hether as jo u rn a lis t or 
theoretician - for movements which contained 
the  seed o f re v o lu t io n . S e e in g  th e  
revolutionary potential of the working class, 
he thereafter focused his theoretical and 
p rac tica l a c tiv ity  on the needs and 
development of the working class movement.
The attitude we are examining turns this 
upside down. An attachment to the role of the 
working class - or rather, to a particular 
selection from Marx’s writings about it in his 
day - serves as a reason for ignoring what was 
Marx’s first concern: evidence of revolutionary 
potential in any movements or strata in the 
contemporary world. If such schools of 
thought turn a blind eye to the environmental 
movement, their vision is not much keener
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when it conies to the liberation movements of 
women, blacks or gays. Eventually, after the 
passage of time, some Galileo may be able to 
persuade them to look through his telescope. 
But they w ill need firs tto  be convinced thatthe 
sights they will see can somehow (perhaps 
tortuously) be reconciled with the true reality - 
which for them (as it never was for Marx) is 
constituted by their doctrine.
To appreciate the damage inherent in such 
an attitude, it is only necessary to consider its 
effect on a talented and perceptive analyst 
such as Hans-Magnus Enzensberger.
•n his article “A Critique of Political 
Ecology" (40) Enzensberger dissects and 
exposes some of the best-publicised analyses 
of the ecological crises, from such spokesmen 
as Ehrlich - characterised by political puerility 
when they are not blatantly pro-imperialist in 
their recommendations. These comments 
alone give the article a high value. A fair 
exposition of its merits should not, indeed, 
stop with that comment; but it is cited here not 
to give a balanced appreciation, but precisely 
to examine a serious defect it contains.
For Enzensberger fa ils  on the m ost 
important question of all: what should we do 
about it?
"The Left .... functions chiefly as an 
instrument of clarification, as a tribunal which 
a tte m p ts  to  d is p e l th e  in n u m e ra b le  
mystifications which dominate ecological 
thinking ....’’ Thus Enzensberger: and we could 
expect a blast to follow, pointing out just how 
sectarian and elitist (and ineffective) it is, to 
observe a real movement and simply stand to 
one side and clarify it. Would it be valid for the 
Left, to see its relation to the trade union 
movement as that of an instructor in the art of 
ideologically correct thinking?
But no such blast is delivered. In the 
quotation above, it might be thought that the 
word “ch iefly” gives him an escape route; but it 
has no significance, since he does not 
describe any other role for the Left - and nor 
does he express his disagreement with the 
sectarian role he has described.
But perhaps he sees no revolutionary 
potential in the ecological movement that 
would justify the Left going beyond the 
distribution of “clarify ing” analyses and 
actually participating in it? Perhaps it is all just 
trendy stuff, with no possibility of involving 
broad masses?
No, this is not his opinion. His analysis of the 
crises is far from implying this naive dismissive 
view, and his perspective of their possible 
development rules it out entirely. He actually 
canvasses the possibility of “ecological 
rebellions” and of “uncontrollable riots” ! A 
disconcerting picture emerges: there are the 
major cities of the capitalist world racked by 
rebellions and riots as the crises deepen, and 
standing apart on the sidelines are the 
theoretically advanced Left, busily clarifying, 
clarifying ....
One cannot help believing, as one reads the 
article, that Enzensberger knows better, that
he would like to say what he carefully never 
does say, that the Left has a duty to participate 
in these movements, and to do any clarifying 
from  w ith in . Why, then , does he so 
conspicuously refrain from saying it?
Perhaps because of a political environment 
dominated by the naive dismissive view 
sketched above, and the consequent fear of 
being labelled a “ revisionist” . Indeed, his 
article abounds with evasive formulations that 
could betoken such a fear.
“ It is after all easy to understand that the 
working class cares little  about general 
environmental problems ....” Yes, indeed; and 
now that we have understood it, what do we 
say about it? Is it right or wrong - progressive, 
like  th e ir lack o f in te res t on phony 
"participation” schemes, or backward, like 
male workers’ lack of interest in women’s 
liberation? Enzensberger is silent.
“ In these circumstances it is not surprising 
that the European Left holds aloof from the 
ecological movement .... ”  Very true - we 
record our lack of surprise; and now, is the Left 
right or wrong in doing this? Again, a 
deafening silence.
At one point he squares his shoulders and 
bravely asserts, straight out: “ By no means all 
ecological movements based on private 
initiative put themselves at the service of the 
interests of qapital with such servility (as those 
dominated by monopoly - A.R.). That is 
demonstrated by the fact thattheiremergence 
has often led to confrontations with the 
police” .
Now, surely now he will come right out and 
say what the Left should do about these 
movements at least! But no - the denouncers of 
revisionism are always on the prowl, and with 
his very next sentence he saves himself just in
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time: “The danger of being used is, however, 
always present.”
(Should the women workers of Petrograd 
really have taken to the streets on International 
Women’s Day in February 1917? After all, there 
was always the danger of being “ used” by 
bourgeois feminism - even if in fact what 
resulted was the Russian Revolution.)
Uneasily brooding on the “danger” , he falls 
back in the sentence after next on a safe and 
familiar remedy for all political ills: “A 'long  
process of clarification will be necessary .... ” 
And we are once more home safe, back in the 
sheltered world of non-participatory analysis.
By confining itself to the study and to a role 
of instruction from afar, the left w ill indeed 
avoid the risk of being ‘used’ - ju s t as an army is 
in no danger of being tricked and out­
manoeuvred if it keeps clear of the battlefield. 
But, specialising from environmental issues in 
general to the nuclear question in particular, it 
must be asked whether the ground should 
really be surrendered to the enemy so easily.
The historical import of the nuclear power 
program derives from the current p light of 
m odern cap ita lism : based f irm ly  on 
consumerist values and concessions, it sees 
the development of that consumerism heading 
inexorably towards the destruction of the 
environment. The coming exhaustion of oil 
reserves is one harbinger of the crisis, and has 
promoted a reckless acceleration of the 
nuclear programs, in an attempt to censure, at 
whatever cost, that consumerist capitalism will 
have available the centralised sources of 
power it needs.
The struggle over nuclear power thus poses 
questions about the very shape of society itself
- as any intervention in this struggle quickly 
reveals. For it is impossible to adopt a purely 
negative stance, attacking nuclear power by 
proposing no alternative energy policy. Many 
of the reformist critics understand this well, 
and offer programs which envisage the 
attainment of social energy goals w ithout the 
use of nuclear power, but which usually 
invo lve s izeable red uc tio ns  in energy 
consum ption  by va rious m ethods of 
conservation.
But such a conservation policy would 
represent an extraordinary historical ‘tu rn ’ by
a consumerist capitalist society, wedded as it 
is to continual expansion; a society, moreover, 
in which the relative weight of the ‘Energy 
Company’ grows day by day. Can such a 
society significantly restrict its energy 
consumption over a whole business cycle - for 
example, in a time of recession, w ill it throttle 
down on vitally needed expansion plans, 
simply because they are energy-expensive? 
And what would be the social and political 
reverberations of such energy-conserving 
policies as were adopted?
These important questions usually get scant 
consideration from moderate advocates of 
conservation. In contrast, those already 
convinced of the need for radical social 
change are less inhibited, and w ill not play 
down the severe strains which an energy crisis 
imples for capitalism today. But their own 
social project will not escape a sim ilar critique, 
unless it has at least the basic outline of a 
solution to the problem - unless it can point to 
the satisfactions it envisages as replacing the 
dubious rewards of the commodity culture.
One project which sketches such a solution 
is that of self-managed socialism. The 
s u b s titu tio n  of the p rin c ip le  o f se lf­
management for the present dominant 
principle of hierarchy, in every walk of life - a 
substitution possible only if the power of the 
capitalist is overthrown, and that of the 
bureaucrat severely limited at least - implies, 
on the level of the individual, the possibility of 
changing the values one lives by. If new 
channels of self-expression and autonomous 
action can be opened up in every social 
sphere, beginning with the factory floor, it w ill 
not be so crushing a catastrophe if beer must 
be bought in bottles rather than in energy- 
expensive aluminium cans.
This point has been made in greater detail 
elsewhere (32). It illustrates how the campaign 
against nuclear power must be finally 
unconvincing, unless it is prepared to 
delineate an alternative social path that does 
not lead to a poisoned world. A receptive 
atmosphere fo r such an exposition is created 
by the striking irrationality of the nuclear 
program which must condemn by association 
the system that gives rise to it, and encourage 
the consideration of rational alternatives.
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